To liven up this particular forum, I am going to copy Vaughn's translation of Jehan de Haynins experiences during the 1467 campaign against Liege. It's a bit long, so I'' type it out in installments over the next few nights, for the benefit of those who might not have read it and seen the interesting details de Haynin relates.

And I, Jehan lord of Haynin, and my brother Colart de Vendegies, to obey the command of my lord the duke and at the request and prayer of my most honoured and redoubted lord, the lord of Fiennes, we left my place at Louvignies near Bavay on a Thursday, 8 October, eighteen of us, foot and horse, to go on campaign in the company and under the standard of my lord of Fiennes. WE lodged at Mairieux near Maubeuge, and on Saturday 10 October at Bersilliers-l'Abbaye, and on Monday 12 October we found the stabdard and the company of my lord of Fiennes in the fields near Binche... We and the [rest of] my lord of Fiennes's company were reviewed on Friday 16 October and on that day I was 44 years old. On the night of 18 October we lodged at and around Noville-sur-Méhaigne, and on Monday 19th at Moulembais near Jodoigne. While we were there, my lord of Fiennes our chief went to the duke at Tirlemont to get news and to learn what he wanted him to do. This was Teusday, 20th, and on his return he told me and some others that my lord the duke had charged him and his men with an undertaking he had refused to several others, which, if it pleased God, would be to his profit and advantage. Within an hour everyone was fully dressed and armed in his lodgeings ready to set out.The time of departure was about 3.0 or 4.0 p.m. Once in the fields, we rode at a fast trot when possible, hopeing to get beyond Namur, which was a good five great leagues from our starting point, that evening. But we had gone only two or three leagues when darkness fell. There was no moonlight... and it got so dark that we could neither see the way, nor scarcely pick out one horse from another, unless it was white or grey. People began to get lost; a man-at-arms fell on one side; an archer on the other.Werode like this for a good two leagues, taking one or two hours in the darkness because we could only go step by step, until most of the company arrived at 9.0 or 10.0 in the evening at a village a leauge from Namur called Vedrin. ONe could only find the houses by seeing the lights inside them, and, whenever tey could be found, people dismounted without orders and in disarray, takeing off and throwing down what they could. We were extremely hungry and continued so, especially as he local people, hearing the disturbance and the noise of men, horses and armour and knowing nothing of our arrival, thought we were from Liége. Several fled and some women were very frightened. We had been told that, as soon as the moon rose, after midnight, we would leave the place, so most of us remained all night in arms with horses saddled, scarcely eating or drinking anything that night except what we brought with us. But all this trouble and difficulty was to no purpose because we didn't leave early the next morning. It was a wonder nobody broke a leg or an arm. Some people who went to the church broke down two doors in order to lodge in it; that is to say, the door of the nave and the door of the chancel; but we didn't leave next morning until it was quite late.

More tomorrow.

That same Tuesday, 20 October, the lord of Biévres, bailiff of Hainault, and the lord of Aymeries and their company set fire to several houses and villages in the territory of Liége and burnt down a large number.
On the next day. Wednesday 21st, my lord of Fiennes and his company left Vedrin and waited a long time at the gate of La Herbate in Namur for his men to arrive and assemble. And they did this only with difficulty, because it had been such a dark night. When most of them had collected together they passed through Namur and took the direct route towards Huy hopeing there would be no one there, or at most only a few people, and that, when they saw these troops, they would be frightened into abandoning the town. This enterprise had been undertaken partly on the advice of some people of Namur then in the lord of Fiennes's company. That Wednesday they rode all day till evening, when they lodged in a village called Bonneville, in the county of Namur not far from Samson, and around and beyond it. THe lord of Fiennes went to see the lord of Boussu at this lodgeing and he promised that he would accompany him the next day, but he sent to excuse himself that night because he had recieved a letter from my lord the duke summoning him to Tirlemont.
THe next day, which was Thursday 22 October, the company left Bonneville at daybreak and went toward Huy, but because of the very bad road through the woods, mountains and valleys, where for the most part one could only go in single file and cautiously, though it was only two or three leagues to Huy, it must have been 10.0 or 11.0 a.m., or even later, by the time we arrived outside the town. Some said an undertaking of this kind should be carried out at daybreak; others said not, it could have just as successful an outcome at midday or at 9.0 a.m., as any other time...

Tomorrow the undertaking of Huy.

When we were half a league away [from Huy] it began to rain hard, which continued most of the day. The infantry, numbering about three or four hundred, were ordered to advance. Some of them were from the toen of Huy, having left it when it was taken [by the men of Liége]. These infantrymen were led to the summit of the highest hill overlooking the town and castle towards the paper-mill, from which [the enemy] could be seen and discovered. After the infantry went the mounted archers, four or five hundred strong. When these reached the top of the hill these troops, with the men-at-arms after them, numbering about sixty, their swordsmen with them, might altogether have numbered at most 900 combatants, not more. The archers dismounted, took off their spurs, and with the infantrymen, who were all from Namur, as well as my lord Anthoine de Halewin, Baudoin de Lannoy, Hue de Humieres, the bailiff of Namur and the bailiff of Messines in Flanders, Hollebeque by name, they descended the hill, crossed the stream called le Hoyoux and approached the walls to shoot at the town gate, which they found closed. They set fire to it. On the way they they found a single man outside the town, whom they killed. My lord of Fiennes and his men-at-arms had stayed in order of battle on top of the hill, out in the open and within cannon-shot of the castle, to cover and support the archers and infantry if they had to retreat. Some of the infantrymen, especially some twelve, sixteen or twenty who lived at HUy, left the rest without giving word, and worked round the left to try to enter the town by a hidden postern they knew of. Most of them were taken or killed but the rest escaped. When the people in the town, and the lady of Lyntre and Collart delle Porte who were in the castle, realised they were under attack, they summoned all their people to arms as fast as possible, rang their bell, and sounded a bugle in the castle and began to fire at the infantry with cross-bows, culverins and serpentines. One of Lois de Bournonville's archers was hit through the thigh by a culverin, the bullet from which remained in the other thigh; he had to be taken to a doctor at Binche, where he recovered. One man, named Henry de Bournonville, was killed by a cross-bow bolt, as well as two of Hustin de Lannoy's archers... and several others, ten or twelve in all at most. When [the defenders] saw that the skirmishing was continuing so long, they lit a fire high up in the castle as if signalling for help. From the castle they fired three or four serpentine shots right among the men-at-arms drawn up on a hill. It was amazing that several weren't killed or wounded for there is no sense in remaining drawn up in battle order within cannon-shot except when marching against the enemy.... The men who had gone down [to the walls] attacked them and skirmished for at least an hour or thereabouts and clearly saw that they were labouring in vain, for they had neither a single ladder to scale the walls, nor a pick-axe nor a hook to remove stones, nor any devise for cutting or breaking sown the gate, nor any artillery and, though some of the men from Namur said : 'They are fleeing and we'll dine and drink good wine again at night inside the town', the contrary was the truth, because they weren't fleeing at all.... So everybody climbed back up the hill and got back to their horses as fast as they could, and so returned without having achieved anything else.... If those in the town had been powerful enough to sally out in force our company would have been in great danger unless God had come to their aid. For they numbered only a few and were a good ten leagues in advance of any men-at-arms who might have been able to help them. Moreover they could only retreat or depart in single file from the said hill.

Thus ends the attempt on Huy. I'll write more of Vaughns extracts from de Haynin pertaining to LIege later. I hope we can examine this first-hand account, and begin a discussion on aspects of Late Medieval warfare it reveals.

[ 01-31-2007: Message edited by: chef de chambre ]

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Db

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One of the most readily apparent weaknesses of the last feudal army raised by the Valois dukes before the inception of the comapnies of the ordinances is the horrific command and control problems faced by a medieval commander. The difficulties in merely organising a body of men to march - even less than a thousand (the size of an 18th or 19th century regiment of infantry) seem to have been great. De Haynin repeatdly writes of the small body of men he was attatched to getting off to very late starts, and confusion in order of march, as well as halting a march.

Command and control issuea abound, and although de Haynin is removed from close contact with the overall command decisions of his commander, the lord of Fiennes, one gets the sense reading that decisions are made by committee of men, clearly of similar rank, and one hopes of men of sound experience (although the results of the march to and skirmish at Huy is not much positive evidence of sound judgement and experience being relied on).

On the positive side, we see clever schemes tried by both the vassals of Burgundy, and the Liegois - noteably the attempt on the hidden postern at Huy by the townsmen of the place in the Burgundian ranks, likewise the ruse of the castle garrison when they see the Burgundians apparently settleing in as possibly a vanguard for a blockading or besieging force, in making a false signal to non-existant forces for relief. I think probably the vigorous skirmishing in defence of the place, coupled with the signal caused the Burgundians withdrawal.

The failed attempt on the postern also illustrates the command and controll problems of the lord of Fiennes's command - the attempt might possibly have been successful if the fellows attempting it had told their commanders, so they could properly support it, or at least been aware of it and possibly reenforce the attempt. Whoever was responsible for the Burgundian forces choice of approach on Huy did not deserve their responsibility of command, as the approach clearly made a quick retreat while in contact with a aggressive enemy extremely difficult, and potentially disasterous, as they could only retire in single file from that hill.

So, what do other people think of de Haynin's experience here?

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towards the paper-mill There was a mill making paper in this town! How cool is that. And common thought is that all correspondence was made on rolls of parchment.

mounted archers, four or five hundred strong. When these reached the top of the hill these troops, with the men-at-arms after them, numbering about sixty, So that’s 460-560 horses all in one spot, just for this little engagement. Holy cow that's a load of horses! When would I ever see that many horses in one place in my life? Also, no mention of archers on foot. Hmmmm, interesting. Note to self- modern reenactment is pointless.

Baudoin de Lannoy Hey, I've seen his painting! Big nose, sleepy eyes, big hat. Wow, I know the face of someone who was there. It's like family photos!

the lady of Lyntre and Collart delle Porte who were in the castle, realized they were under attack, they summoned all their people to arms as fast as possible, rang their bell, and sounded a bugle in the castle and began to fire at the infantry with cross-bows, culverins and serpentines. You go girls! Who says medieval women weren't good for much more than sitting around all day looking pretty. These women rock.

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This argument stems from the notion that 'billmen would have practiced in the vilage', seeing as 'billmen' do not exist as a troop type as such and are the lowest paid why do they have training? Who trains them? And other such strange and contradictory ideas.

The general amateur nature of these citizen soldiers would explain the simple battle formations, ie a few big units, on bth sides of WOTR. The men are not disciplined trained men, but men who are there due to legal requirement. The numbers of trained and experienced men would be miniscule.

And as your Heynin text shows even with a recorded and ordinanced army of Burgundy there is a major problem with discipline and coordination. The Burgundians were supposed to be state of the art I believe.

"There was a mill making paper in this town! How cool is that. And common thought is that all correspondence was made on rolls of parchment."

Saunters in, looks around, drops some casual factoids re paper:

France was exporting paper to England from the 14thc onwards, had loads of paper mills.

The Black Prince's Jodrell Pass is written on paper.

Most paper used in England up until some point in the 16thc was French. Caxton's books are almost all on French made paper.

The first paper factory in Europe was at Fabriano in the 13th C.

First recorded use of it in Europe is in 1125 by Roger of Helmerhausen, know to us as Theophilus - of Divers Arts fame. He mentions it as Byzantine parchment (made from flax) in reference to books of gold leaf, suggesting it was exported to Germany (and quite likely elsewhere) from the East.

Oh and England bought German paper too and Flemish, as well as rady printed and 'painted' papers.

England being a cultural backwater didn't get a paper mill until 1480 and it couldn't meet demand.

Bob I have your email and will reply.

[ 02-02-2007: Message edited by: gregory23b ]

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Actually, what is cool about this campaign is that it is the driving force behind Charles creating the comapnies of the ordinances - this was the last Burgundian army relying on the inadequate feudal host as it's primary troop resources, only bolstered by the ducal household, and mercenaries. These guys weren't the ordinance army, which did have a much better preformance record - but still was incredibly amature. They preformed wonders in comparison to this army though.

When the campaign showed the hopeless inadequacy of these resources, as well as the impossibility of keeping an army under arms long enough to suit Charles's military ambitions, he determined to dun the money out of the estates of Flanders and Brabant for the funds to create and maintain the ordinance troops - he spent a large ammount of effort through 1470, until the summer of 1471 putting the money in place and recruiting the soldiers.

I had never noticed before I typed this account out (and I've read it a half-dozen times), that the attempt on Huy took part in the rain. It probably would explain the light casualties all around - not only would firearms be less effective (although the defenders on the castle walls and in the town managed to at least injure one person), but the rain would have had an effect on crossbow strings and warbow strings.

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thanks for this Bob, very interesting. Is there more?

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Yes there is, and I'll make a posting after I do my chores.

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on the 28th of October, duke Charles drew up his men in line of battle at Brustem ..."He had drawn up battle orders the night before and now personally rode round the various companies carrying these instructions with him. Battle was joined in the first place by
the artillery, with which each side was well supplied, but to little effect. The fire from the army of Liége mostly went harmlessly over the Burgundians' heads, while the Burgundian artillery seems to have done the same over the Liégois, though it inconvenienced them by bringing down branches of trees as thick as legs and arms onto their heads. The Liégois enjoyed the better defensive position, protected as they were by trees and thick hedges, with marshes covering their flanks, and Duke Charles, fearful of a surprise attack by the enemy during the coming night, resolved to try to dislodge them by sending his archers against them. These archers were ordered to dismount, leaving their horses to be looked after by some of their companions, a single man holding up to ten to twelve horses. Even then, many of them were stolen during the battle. With some difficulty the archers successfully fought their way through hedges and ditches into the village of Brustem, the mounted men-at-arms following where they had cleared the way. A mounted attack down the main road from St. Trond to Brustem by Philip the Good's bastard son Baudouin was beaten off by the defenders and, indeed, de Haynin tells us that there was no way in which the Burgundian cavalry could successfully attack the enemy: the infantry, apparently consisting of two or three thousand archers only, won the day for Duke Charles. The battle had not begun until the afternoon, and nightfall saved the lives of many of the Liégois, though their tents and pavillions, their carts and baggage, and their artillery, all fell into the hands of the Burgundians. Many of their leaders remained dead on the field of battle, together with three canons of St. Lambert's. But the seneschal of Lyons, François Royer, and Raes de Lyntre, the most prominent of the Liége revolutionaries escaped.
Brustem was a brilliant victory for Duke CHarles, but the success was by no means effectively exploited. His soldiers now dallied at Brustem viewing and robbing thte corpses and amassing loot. (and now de Haynins words)

We found provisions in their carts which came in most handy to some of the troops. Among others, some of my, Jehan de Haynin's archers brought in a cart with a barrel of wine which lasted us, nineteen in number, two days, together with bread, salt meat and cheese in another cart, which lasted fourteen days.... Several people thought that if the vab or another large body of troops had advanced into enemy territory the day after the battle, they would have done very well and freely and easily got as far as Looz, or Tongres or even the city of Liege. But nothing was done.

To summarise, when the Burgundian army finally left the vicinity on the 1st of November, the dependencies of Liége such as Looz and Tongres fell very rapidly, in the case of Looz without opposition. In Liége, resistance collapsed without a fight, Charles had the walls dismantled, and settled a ruinous peace on Liége, which led to a final revolt and the destruction of the city as an independant entity a year later. Vaughn translates some of de Haynins commentary on those events as well, but I am typed out for the moment, and will resume tomorrow.

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